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This study is an evaluation of the port of Yokosuka,
Japan as a typhoon "haven." Characteristics of the port
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1. INTRODUCTION
The hazard associated with a mature tropical cyclone is
serious to all ships, no matter their size. The foremost
thought of commanders when confronted with the threat imposed
by a typhoon is that when the threat has abated will his
unit(s) be able to proceed as directed to complete its assigned
mission. The usual practice is to try to avoid the typhoon
and its far ranging danger area entirely which usually implies
an evasion at sea.
This study examines the Japanese port of Yokosuka as a
typhoon haven. An attempt is made to answer the following
questions when a typhoon threatens Yokosuka. Should a unit
remain in port rather than put to sea, or when a typhoon
threatens a ship at sea should that ship seek the shelter of
Yokosuka? The intent is to provide an aid to the commander
in his decision-making process.
The decision includes the weighing of many factors.
Items to be considered, for example, may include the U.S.
Fleet Weather Central/Joint Typhoon Warning Center (FWC/JTWC),
Guam warnings, the climatology for the time of year, the
physical features of the port itself, and the options if the
shi p puts out to sea .
An operationally oriented flow chart is foun'd on page 65
in Figure 33. This chart identifies pertinent pages of this




An informative and convenient method to view the typhoon
is to look at its evolution from a weak tropical disturbance
to its dissipating stage. The evolution from a tropical
disturbance to a mature typhoon and subsequent dissipation is
usually a slow process but it can at times be wery rapid.
Several of the terms used to describe the life cycle are as




A tropical disturbance, the formative stage from
which a typhoon may develop, is a weak low pressure area
charaterized by below normal pressure, abnormal cloudiness,
shower activity and weak cyclonic wind flow. The disturbance
forms in the low latitudes over a warm sea surface. The fall
of barometric pressure is generally a slow, gradual process
to about 1000 millibars (mb). The strongest winds occur to
the north of the developing vortex in the Northern Hemisphere
2. Tropical Cyclone
A tropical cyclone is a cyclone originating over
the tropical ocean. Weather fronts are not associated with
the tropical cyclone as with temperate latitude cyclones and
most of its energy is derived from an intricate system which,
to a large extent, is dependent upon the sea-surface tempera-
ture (SST). The SST is usually greater than 26°C. In the
Northern Hemisphere the wind rotates counterclockwise around
the warm center core of low pressure.
3. Tropical Depression
A tropical depression defines the situation when
there is a closed circulation (a closed isobar generally

locates the center of the depression) -and the maximum
sustained wind speed is below 34 kt (gusts may exceed 34 kt).
Warnings are issued on depressions only when intensification
is expected.
4. Tropical Storm
If a tropical cyclone has maximum sustained winds
of 34 to 63 kt it is termed a tropical storm and is assigned
a name by the FWC/JTV/C, Guam. Not all tropical cyclones
reach this stage.
Assuming that the cyclone intensifies, the center
pressure falls rapidly below 1000 mb and the winds form a
tight band around the center. Cloud and rain patterns develop
into narrow organized bands, spiraling inward toward the
center.
5. Typhoon
A tropical cyclone in which the maximum sustained
winds are 64 kt or greater is called a typhoon. The tropical
cyclone is considered immature as long as the barometric
pressure falls and the speed of the gusty winds increases.
In an immature stage the typhoon strength winds may exist
within a relatively small area.
When the center surface pressure stops falling, and
the sustained wind speed regime stabilizes, the mature stage
is reached; however the size of the storm may still increase
and do so over a number of days. The circulation of a mature
typhoon may be over 1000 n mi in diameter.
The right side of a tropical cyclone in the Northern
Hemisphere is known as the "dangerous semicircle," while the
left side is known as the "navigable semicircle" (navigable
does not imply that a ship can maneuver without difficulty).
Figure 1 gives an overall view of the wind pattern around the
eye of a Northern Hemisphere 150-kt typhoon. Note the relation





Figure 1. Distribution of surface wind speeds (in knots)
around a large, intense typhoon in the northern hemisphere
over open water. The arrow indicates direction of movement




Figure 2 depicts the general wind field about a 1 50- k
t
Northern Hemisphere typhoon. The angle of inflow varies
considerably with each typhoon. Note the tightening of the
pressure gradient in the right semicircle relative to the
direction of motion.
6. Dissipation Stage
Dissipation occurs when the maximum wind speed
declines steadily along with a rising central barometric
pressure .
2.2 MOVEMENT
Individual tropical cyclones (henceforth the term
tropical cyclone refers to tropical depressions, tropical
storms, and typhoons) may follow irregular and widely differ-
ing tracks. In general they begin in the tropics and usually
move west-northwest. Some cyclones move from the tropical
latitudes to the temperate latitudes, their northwest move-
ment becoming northward and finally northeastward. This
change in direction through north to the northeast is termed
"recurvature . " In a study of 586 tropical storms and typhoons
which occurred during the months of May-December 1945-1959,
Burroughs and Brand (1972) found that 236 (40%) of them
recurved. The majority of typhoons which are a ma.tter of
concern to Yokosuka are the recurvers. Appendix A shows the
tracks of all typhoons for the June-October period for the
24 years 1946-1969. The above value of 40% is derived from
Table 1. Mote the change in the percent that recurve for
each month.
Tropical cyclones typically move at 8-14 kt prior to
recurvature. After recurvature, they can accelerate within a
period of 48 hours to speeds 2-3 times that at the point of
recurvature. This acceleration is mainly due to the system





Figure 2. Wind circulation around a 150-kt typhoon in the
Northern Hemisphere. Each pennant indicates 50 kt of wind
and each barb indicates 10 kt (after Harding and Kotsch,
1965).

Table 1. Recurving tropical storms and typhoons versus total
number of tropical storms and typhoons separated by monthly









































May-December 236 586 40
As a tropical cyclone moves into temperate latitudes,
it comes into contact with cooler surface waters and cooler
air is drawn into its circulation. These factors hasten its
dissipation.
2.3 SEA STATE AROUND TROPICAL CYCLONES
Wind is the driving force which generates the waves and
produces the state of the sea. Swell, which affects ship
movement, extends well beyond the wind field associated with
a tropical cyclone. A miscalculation or imprudent decision
concerning sea conditions may lead to a destructive rendezvous
with the storm. Though the tropical cyclone's wind pattern
can be forecasted with fair accuracy for any direction and
distance relative to the center, a forecast of the sea state
is more difficult. The character of the sea state is primarily
a function of storm size, duration and intensity.

Figure 3 shows the combined sea height associated with
21 tropical storms and typhoons (based on 173 analyses for
the year 1971) plotted as a function distance from the storm
center and storm intensity (Brand, et al . , 1973). There is
an obvious relationship between the sea state and storm
intensity. A tropical storm (wind category 35-64 kt) can
produce 12-ft seas 210 n mi from the storm center, while an
intense typhoon (wind category >/100 kt) can produce 12-ft seas
450 n mi from the center. The distances given are mean
distances since the isopleths of combined sea height are not
symmetric about the storm center. Brand et al . (1973) found
that the actual wave heights are at least partially dependent
on the direction in which the storm is moving. For example,
Figure 4 shows the average combined sea-height pattern for
recurved storms moving on headings between 001° and 090° and
is based on 24 sea-state analyses for tropical storms and
typhoons that occurred during 1971. The mean speed of move-
ment and mean wind speed for these analyses were 12.1 kt and
64.2 kt, respectively. Note that the greatest area of higher
seas (9-15 ft range) exists in the right (dangerous) semicircle
of the storm.
The combined sea height is defined as the square root
of the sum of the squares of "significant" sea and swell
height. Sea is wind waves and swell consists of wind
generated waves which have advanced into regions of weaker or
calm winds. "Significant" will be defined here as the average


































































































NUMBER OF ANALYSES 24
Figure 4. Combined sea-height isopleths (9-15 ft)based on 24 analyses of tropical storms and typhoonsheading between 001° - 090°. The mean speed ^emovement and mean wind speeds for these 24 analyses
et al 1973^







Japan is an island nation in the western part of the
North Pacific Ocean off the eastern coast of the Asiatic
mainland consisting of a chain of islands extending in an arc
from northeast to southwest. The northeastern tip of the
chain is at 46N, 143E and the southernmost point is at 26N,
131E. The four main islands of Japan from north to south are
Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu. Hundreds of smaller
islands lie off the coasts of the main ones. Figure 5 shows
the position of Japan relative to the surrounding land and
water masses.
3.2 HONSHU
Honshu is the largest of the main Japanese Islands.
Yokosuka, a major port city in southeast Honshu, is used
continuously by the U.S. Navy. It is currently homeport for
a number of SEVENTH Fleet units.
A detailed description of the coasts and harbors of
Honshu can be found in the Sailing Directions (Enroute) for
Japan, Pub. No. 156. For specific guidance on navigational
aids and additional features in the vicinity of Yokosuka,










































































4.1 LOCATION AND TOPOGRAPHY
The port of Yokosuka is located at 35°17'N, 139°40'E in
the central part of the Miura Peninsula on the southwest side
of landlocked Tokyo Bay. The harbors of Yokohama and Tokyo
are also in Tokyo Bay and Figure 6 locates some pertinent
features. Tokyo Bay penetrates the southeast coast of Honshu
in a northerly direction for a distance of almost 35 n mi
.
Approximately 200 ships transit Uraga Suido, the entrance to
2Tokyo Bay, daily.
The coast immediately adjacent to Tokyo Bay is low, but
to the north and northwest are high mountains. Figure 7
depicts the predominant topographical features of central
Honshu. The island of Honshu is one of the most rugged of
land areas. The mountains in the north central area average
5,000 to 10,000 ft in height and are often called the Japanese
Alps. The highest mountain, Fujiyama (12,395 ft), is located
60 miles due west of Yokosuka. Northern Honshu is less
mountainous.
Figure 8 shows the topography to the north and east of
Yokosuka. Note the relative flatness of this terrain as
compared with the terrain to the west and northwest of Yokosuka
Southern Honshu is even less jagged with no peaks rising over
5,000 ft. The rugged terrain of Honshu influences the weather
at Yokosuka.
Uraga Suido is a controlled traffic route, one of
several controlled routes established by the Japanese Maritime
Safety Agency to regulate shipping traffic in highly congested















Figure 6. Tokyo Bay and the surrounding land area.
The hatched area (Yokosuka region) is enlarged







































































































Yokosuka Bay is at the southwestern end of the inner part
of Tokyo Bay. The harbor of Yokohama, a large commercial
port, is about 10 n mi northv/ard of Yokosuka Bay. Tokyo
Harbor is about 20 n mi north-northeastward of Yokosuka. The
harbor of Yokosuka can be classified as a medium-sized harbor
of the coast breakwater type.
4.2 YOKOSUKA HARBOR
Yokosuka Harbor is entered from the southern part of
Tokyo Bay. The harbor is bounded on the east by part of the
Miura Peninsula which is the site of the U.S. Fleet Activities
(FLEACTS) Yokosuka, and on the west by Azuma Hanto which is
actually an island. Azuma Hanto separates Yokosuka Harbor
from Nagura Harbor which is used by the Japanese Maritime
Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and is a commercial port. Nagura
Harbor is entered from the southwestern part of Yokosuka Bay.
A small, narrow channel separates Azuma Hanto at its south-
western end from the mainland.
The entrance to the harbor of Yokosuka is about 500 yards
wide between the 5-fathom curves. Depths in the harbor
decrease from 11 fathoms in the entrance to less than 5
fathoms near the head. A pilot is required when proceeding
into or out of drydocks'and their services are recommended
when a vessel exceeds 5000 tons and/or has a single screw.
The harbor can accommodate about 20 ships of various types at
3
any one time. Appendix B lists the harbor facilities of
Yokosuka. The buoys in the Yokosuka region are listed in
Appendix C.
The trend toward larger ship types has reduced the
pierside berthing capacity inside the port. The optimum load
out for the port has been suggested as 1 CVA, 1 CL6 and 14-18
other various ship types.
19

Figure 9 is a photograph of Yokos.uka Harbor which shov/s
the local topographical features in the immediate vicinity of
the port of Yokosuka. Note the protection afforded berths
8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 and drydock 6 from northerly winds



















.BERTH 12 I " k *^
*?
^



















Figure 9. Aerial photograph of the Port of Yokosuka.
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5. TROPICAL CYCLONES AFFECTING YOKOSUKA
5.1 CLIMATOLOGY
Tropical cyclones which affect Yokosuka generally form in
an area bounded by the latitudes 5N and 30N and the longitudes
120E and 165E. The latitudinal boundaries shift poleward
during the summer months and then equatorward in winter in
response to the seasonal changes of the synoptic environment.
The great contrast between the cold continental air masses of
winter and the warm maritime tropical circulation in summer
is the fundamental key to the seasonal changes.
In the genesis area mentioned above typhoons have occurred
in all months but, with rare exceptions, those affecting the
main Japanese Islands are confined to the period of May to
November. Late summer and early autumn are the likeliest
seasons. Size and intensity of the storms vary widely.
The majority of those that pose a threat to Yokosuka
(any tropical cyclone approaching within 180 n mi of Yokosuka
is defined as a "threat" for the purpose of this study) occur
during the months June-October. Figure 10(a) gives the
frequency distribution of threat occurrences by 5-day periods.
This summary is based on data for the 27 years 1947-1973.
Note that the maximum number occur during August and September.
Figure 10(b) depicts on an 8-point compass the "threat"
tropical cyclones according to the octant from which they
approached Yokosuka. The circled numbers indicate the total
that approached from an individual octant. The count for an
A total of 82 tropical cyclones passed within 180 n mi
of Yokosuka during the May-November period for the years
1947-1973. Seventy-six (93%) of these tropical cyclones
passed within 180 n mi during the 5 months, June-October, and
















Figure 10 (a) . Frequency distribution of the number of
tropical cyclones that passed within 180 n mi of Yokosuka.
Subtotals are based on 5-day periods for tropical cyclones
that occurred during 1947-1973.
Figure 10 (b) . Octant from which tropical cyclones (June-
October, 1947-1973) approached to within 180 n mi of
Yokosuka. Circled numbers indicate the number that approach
from each octant. The number in parenthesis is the per-




octant of approach includes both recurvers and non-recurvers .
Note that a majority of these approach from the south-
southwest and west-southwest. A more detailed inspection of
the sample of 76 tracks revealed that only 9 (12%) did not
recurve before passing within 180 n mi of Yokosuka.
Figure 11 depicts the tracks of these nine tropical
cyclones and are presented for general information. A number
of them, however, did recurve at a later time. The latitude
of recurvature is generally higher for the months of July and
August. Since the speed of advance and wind intensities of
these tropical cyclones vary considerably, significant con-
clusions about these systems could not be reached.
An overview of the climatology of tropical cyclones that
passed within 180 n mi of Yokosuka is provided in Figures 12
to 16 and shows a statistical summary based on tropical
5
cyclone tracks for the years 1947-1973. The data are grouped
by months, June to October. Since tracks were recorded for
5-day periods, exact calendar months could not be used.
In Figures 12 to 16 the total number of tropical cyclones,
N, that passed through each 3° lat/long square for a given
month is printed at the top of each square. To aid in the
analysis of the tracks, an arbitrarily chosen line oriented
southeast (SE) to northwest (NW) is passed through Yokosuka.
A circle of radius 3° latitude (180 n mi ) is drawn centered
on Yokosuka as shown in Figures 12 to 16. At the bottom of
each 3°X3° square is a number, RAD, which represents the
percent of those tropical cyclones that passed through the
square and subsequently passed within 180 n mi of Yokosuka.
b From Chin for the years 1947-1970, and FWC/JTWC Annual




















Figure 11. Tracks of the 9 tropical cyclones that had some
westerly motion within 180 n mi of Yokosuka (based on data













N = NUMBER OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THIS
SQUARE FOR THE MONTH
Li= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LIME EXTENDING
NW FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N MI (TLAT)
L 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 180 N MI (3°LAT)
Rl= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N HI (TLAT)
R 3
= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 180 N MI (3°LAT)
RAO = PERCENT OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THE
SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED WITHIN 130 H MI OF
YOKOSUKA
FOR THE MONTH OF:
JUN (31 MAY 29 JUN)
Figure 12. Statistical summary of tropical cyclones for





















N = NUMBER OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THIS
SQUARE FOR THE MONTH
Li= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AMD SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 K MI (1 C LAT)
L 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 180 N MI (3°LAT)
R]= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N MI (TLAT)
R 3
= PERCENT OF ALL TRO°ICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 180 N Ml (3°LAT)
RAD = PERCENT OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THE
SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY FASSED WITHIN 180 N MI OF
YOKOSUKA
FOR THE MONTH OF:
JUL (30 JUN _ 29 JUL)
Figure 13. Statistical summary of tropical cyclones for















N = NUMBER OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THIS
SQUARE FOR THE MONTH
Lj= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSEO THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 fl MI (1°LAT)
L 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF ISO M MI (3°LAT)
Rl= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSEO THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N MI (l'LAT)
R 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 180 N MI (3°LAT)
RAD = PERCENT OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THE
SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED WITHIN 180 N MI OF
YOKOSUKA.
FOR THE MONTH OF:
AUG {3 ° JUL • 2Q AUG)
Figure 14. Statistical summary of tropical cyclones for














N = NUMBER OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THIS
SQUARE FOR THE MONTH
Li= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N MI (1°LAT)
L 3
= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 180 N MI (3"LAT)
Rl= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N MI.(rLAT)
R 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM YOKOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 180 N MI (3°LAT)
RAD = PERCENT OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THE
SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED WITHIN 180 N MI OF
YOKOSUKA
FOR THE MONTH OF:
SEP (29 AUG " 27 SEP)
Figure 15. Statistical summary of tropical cyclones for

















N = NUMBER OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THIS
SQUARE FOR THE MOUTH
Lj= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AMD SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM YO<OSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 fl MI (1°LAT)
L 3
= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
NW FROM YOKCSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE CF 180 N" MI (3°LAT)
Rl= PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AND SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM YOkOSUKA WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 60 N MI (1°LAT)
R 3 = PERCENT OF ALL TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH
THIS SQUARE AMD SUBSEQUENTLY CROSSED A LINE EXTENDING
SE FROM YO<OSU<A WITHIN A DISTANCE OF 180 N MI (3°LAT)
PAD = PERCENT OF TROPICAL CYCLONES THAT PASSED THROUGH THE
SQUARE AMD SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED WITHIN 180 N MI OF
YOKOSUKA
FOR THE MONTH OF:
OCT (23 SEP - 27 OCT)
Figure 16. Statistical summary of tropical cyclones for





Four other parameters, in addition to N and RAD, are
used to assess the "threat" to Yokosuka. The four parameters,
L , , L - , R.,, and R ~ are defined as:
L,: Percentage of all tropical cyclones that passed
through the square and subsequently crossed a line
extending northwest from Yokosuka within a distance






Percentage of all tropical cyclones that passed
through the square and subsequently crossed a line
extending northwest from Yokosuka within a distance
of 180 n mi
.
Percentage of all tropical cyclones that passed
through the square and subsequently crossed a line
extending southeast from Yokosuka within a distance
of 60 n mi
Percentage of all tropical cyclones that passed
through the square and subsequently crossed a line
extending southeast from Yokosuka within a distance
of 1 80 n mi
L-j , L^, R
1
,
and R. are printed at the left and right
edges of the square respectively. For example, in Figure 12,
the outlined square located between 27 and 30N, 126 and 129E
had 8 tropical cyclones pass through it during the years
1947-1973. Of these, 25% (2 tropical cyclones) subsequently
approached within 180 n mi of Yokosuka. Both of these tropi-
cal cyclones (that is, 25%) passed within 180 n mi to the
northwest and 12% (only one) passed within 60 n mi to the
northwest of Yokosuka; none passed to the southeast of
Yokosuka.
Note that L^ + R-, need not equal RAD since a tropical




Figures 17 to 21 represent an analysis of the RAD numbers
from the above figures. The solid lines show a "percent
threat" for any tropical cyclone location within the area
examined. The dashed lines represent the approximate time in
days for a system to reach Yokosuka. For example, in Figure
17, a tropical cyclone located at 28N, 136E has approximately
a 50% probability of passing within 180 n mi of Yokosuka and
will reach Yokosuka in about one day.
The speed range was arrived at by considering that as
tropical cyclones recurve, their forward speed characteris-
tically, but not always, slows to about 10 kt during the
recurvature period. It should be expected that the system
will subsequently accelerate rapidly toward the north or
northeast. Speeds of 20 to 30 kt are common and speeds as
great as 50 kt have been observed (Somervell and Jarrell,
1970). Table 2 presents the information from which the
approximate time in days for a tropical cyclone to reach
Yokosuka was compute-d.
Table 2. Listing of average climatological speeds of tropical























































































































































































































































































































































































































In an examination of 66 recurving typhoons (1957-1968),
Riehl (1971) found that most typhoons reach their maximum
intensity at, or just prior to, the point of recurvature
(see Table 3). Since the mean latitude of recurvature in
WESTPAC is approximately 23°N, most typhoons are decreasing
in intensity as they are approaching Japan.
Table 3. Point of reaching typhoon maximum intensity for 66
cases of recurving typhoons based on 12-hourly observations
(1957-1968) (after Riehl, 1971).
Maximum intensity occurred
within 12 hours of recurvature
Number of Cases
43
Maximum intensity occurred one
day or more before recurvature
22
Maximum intensity occurred one
day or more after recurvature
1
Total 66
5.3 WIND AND TOPOGRAPHICAL EFFECTS
In the 5 months June-October for the 22 years 1952-1973,
a total of 64 tropical cyclones passed within 180 n mi of
Yokosuka, or about 3 per year. Table 4 groups the 64 tropical
cyclones by strong (^22 kt) and gale force (>_34 kt) wind
intensities they produced at Yokosuka. Tropical cyclone
activity within 180 n mi of Yokosuka is maximum during the
months of August and September and these individual monthly
values are also shown.
7 Data provided by Naval Weather Service Detachment,




Table 4. Extent to which tropical cyclones affected Yokosuka
during the period 1952-1973, June-October and for the
individual months of August and September.
Number of tropical cyclones




Number of tropical cyclones
resulting in strong (^22 kt)
winds at Yokosuka
47 (73%) 14 (64%) 15 (79%)
Number of tropical cyclones
resulting in gale force
(>34 kt) winds at Yokosuka
20 (31%) 5 (23%) 11 (58%)
It can be discerned from Table 4 that only 20 (31%) of
the total 64 tropical cyclones for the period June-October
(1952-1973) resulted in winds of 34 kt or greater at Yokosuka.
However, note that of the 19 tropical cyclones in September,
11 (58%) of these resulted in winds of 34 kt or greater.
Figures 22 and 23 show the tracks of the 20 tropical
cyclones that resulted in gale force winds or greater at
Yokosuka for the period June-October, 1952-1973. Figure 23
isolates the 11 tracks of September in order to show that most
of these passed west of Yokosuka and initially struck Japan on
the south coast of Honshu. Note in Figures 22 and 23 that
recurvature generally occurs further south for the September
and October tropical cyclones than do the July and August
systems. Also, in Figure 22 note the track of the tropical
cyclone which is headed in an easterly direction and then
looped back toward Honshu again!
When the tracks in Figures 22 and 23 are compared with
all the tracks for the same monthly period in Appendix A, it
can be seen that while tropical cyclones have approached




Figure 22. Tracks of 9 tropical cyclones resulting in v/inds
>_34 kt at Yokosuka for the months June-August and October
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majority approach along a threat axis that is oriented
general ly 'southeast to west-southwest from Yokosuka. This
threat axis is evident in Figures 17-21 by the "percent
threat" lines.
The observation station for the Naval Weather Service
Facility (NWSF), Yokosuka is located on top of a 175 ft hill
at FLEACTS Yokosuka, and the wind instrument is another 55
feet above the staion; the observed wind velocity is about
10 kt greater than that observed in the harbor, but otherwise
o
is representative. In the period 1953-1973, the highest
recorded wind (gust) in Yokosuka was 96 kt. The southerly
gust of 96 kt was attributed to Typhoon Ida which passed about
20 n mi to the northwest of Yokosuka on 26 September 1958.
Winds in the harbor during the passage of a severe
tropical cyclone are greatly influenced by the surrounding
topography and the extent of this influence is dictated by the
direction of approach of the storm and the passage relative
to Yokosuka. From an analysis of the tropical cyclone tracks
in Figures 22 and 23, it is apparent that tropical cyclones
that result in gale force winds or greater at Yokosuka can
pass to the east or pass to the west of Yokosuka. The basic
difference between the two passages is the direction of the
resultant wind on the harbor. If the tropical cyclone passes
to the west of Yokosuka, the winds will generally be from the
south. For a passage to the west, the storm must necessarily
cross the mountain ranges of Honshu (see Figure 7). An example
of this was Typhoon Nancy (September, 1961) which had a closest
point of approach (CPA) of 140 n mi west-northwest of Yokosuka.
Nancy pounded the harbor with gusts of 71 kt from the south-
southwest and a sustained wind of about 50 kt for a 4-hour
period.
o
Personal communication with NWSF, Yokosuka
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If the tropical cyclone passes .to the east of Yokosuka,
the path will be over v/ater and the winds will be generally
northerly. An example of this was Typhoon Violet (Oct, 1961)
which had a CPA of 30 n mi to the southeast of Yokosuka. As
a result of Violet, the harbor experienced gusts of 74 kt
from the north-northeast.
Units of the SEVENTH Fleet in port Yokosuka during the
threatening times of Nancy and Violet reported negligible
damage. Appendix D summarizes some of the pertinent factors
of these two typhoons and Command comments with regard to
selected berths.
The beginning and end point of the arrows in Figure 24
give the positions of tropical cyclone centers when winds
>_22 kt occurred at Yokosuka for 47 of the 64 tropical cyclones
(June-December, 1952-1973) that passed within 180 n mi of
Yokosuka. Seventeen of these 64 tropical cyclones did not
result in winds ^22 kt. Similarly, Figure 25 shows the
positions of tropical cyclone centers when winds >_34 kt
occurred at Yokosuka.
In Figure 24, it appears that 22- k t winds or greater do
not generally occur until the tropical cyclone center has
reached 32°N. The best tracks of the 64 tropical cyclones
indicate that 47% passed to the west of Yokosuka and the
remainder passed to the east. A high concentration of line
segments is found in the northeast and southeast quadrants,
relative to Yokosuka, implying that centers located in this
region tend to cause >^22-kt winds in more instances than
centers located in other quadrants. The relative flat regions
to the north and northeast of Yokosuka account for this (see
Figures 7 and 8). Several of the centers over 600 n mi from
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Figure 24. Positions of 47 tropical cyclone centers when >_22 kt
winds first and last occurred at Yokosuka (based on hourly
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Figure 25. Positions of 20 tropical cyclone centers when
>_34 kt winds first and last occurred at Yokosuka (based on
hourly wind data for the months June-October for the years
1952-1973). Note: The letter at the arrowhead shows the
direction of the closest point of approach which the
associated tropical cyclone had with respect to Yokosuka.
45

Note in Figure 25 that 12 (60%) of the 20 tracks associa-
ted with the positions of tropical cyclone centers passed to
the west of Yokosuka. The observed gale force wind velocities
in Yokosuka resulting from these tropical cyclones generally
first exceeded 33 kt when the center was to the north and
east of Yokosuka. There are a number of situations when the
tropical cyclone centers were nearly 300 n mi to the north and
9
east, yet gale force winds were observed at Yokosuka.
5.4 WAVE ACTION
The port of Yokosuka experiences very little v/ave action
as the result of a typhoon transiting the vicinity. The amount
of wave action will vary according to whether the typhoon
passes to the west or to the east of the port with the result-
ing southerly or northerly winds, respectively. The surrounding
land masses and the breakwater located near the entrance to
Yokosuka Harbor are major factors in limiting the wave action
in the port of Yokosuka. Wave action will be greater for a
northerly wind (typhoon passage to the east). The port of
Yokosuka opens onto Tokyo Bay in a north-northeast direction
for a distance of about 25 n mi (see Figure 6). Prior to
arriving at Yokosuka any wind-generated waves from a northerly
direction must travers.e various natural and man-made obstacles,
hence much of the energy contained in these waves is depleted.
Although the topic of this study has been the tropical
cyclone, mainly the typhoon, a word of caution is needed.
Extratropi cal cyclone activity in the Yokosuka and Yokohama
regions, particularly in the four months of January-April,
can also cause destructive winds. Although typhoon-associated
winds normally can be forecasted quite well in advance, such
is not always the case for maximum winds generated by extra-
tropical cyclones. In the latter case, as little as 2 or 3
hours warning may be all that is possible. In 1974, the
maximum peak gust associated with a tropical cyclone (typhoon)
was 54 kt in August, while the maximum peak gust attributed
to an extratropi cal system was 68 kt in April.
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An estimate of the maximum wave height that may be
encountered for typhoon force winds in the region about
Yokosuka and Tokyo Bay is summarized in Table 5. The major
factors considered in this listing was the direction of
tropical cyclone passage relative to Yokosuka, the direction
and velocity of the resultant typhoon force winds, the length
of fetch, a duration greater than 1 hour but less than 5 hours,
and the location of obstacles in the path of the progressing
waves. There is no single theoretical development for deter-
mining the actual growth of waves generated by winds over
relatively shallow water (U.S. Army Coastal Engineering
Research Center, 1973).
Table 5. Approximate maximum wave heights in feet about the
Yokosuka region and Tokyo Bay.
Wave Height (ft)
in the Vi ci ni ty -of




Port of Yokosuka 6 ft 3 ft
Yokosuka Bay 9 5
Tokyo Bay (about 10 n mi
north-northeast of Yokosuka) 12 11
5.5 STORM SURGE
Storm surge may be defined as an abnormal rise of the sea
along a shore as the result of the winds of a storm and the
pressure drop. The piling up of water on a coast ahead of a
tropical storm or typhoon is more apparent in the dangerous
semicircle, the region of most intense winds. The port of
Yokosuka will be placed in the dangerous semicircle, when a
typhoon passes to the west of the area.
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The storm surges are more pronounced along the south
coast of the Japanese Islands to the west of Tokyo Bay.
Tokyo Bay opens onto the south coast of Honshu (see Figure 26)
The surge forms to a large extent after entering the inland
bays since the width of the continental shelf is generally
narrow along the Japanese coast. Most of the surge occurs,
therefore, at the inshore side of these bays, not along the
open coasts nor near the m'outh of the bays. Figure 26 depicts
the 100-, 500-, 1000- , and 2000-fathom curves about Honshu.
During the period 1900 to 1973, peak surges of 7.6 ft (Oct,
1919) and 7.3 ft (Sept, 1938) were observed at the inshore
side of Tokyo Bay. They were the result of southerly winds
caused by typhoons passing generally to the west of Tokyo Bay.
Due to its sheltered position within Tokyo Bay and its
location near the entrance, Yokosuka experiences little storm
surge. Conversations with a knowledgeable civilian employee
in the Port Services Office, Yokosuka, indicate that storm
surges of about 3 ft have been felt within the harbor but have
not been a problem. Surges of this magnitude coupled with
the normal tide range of 4-5 ft for the months of June-October
do not present any unusual difficulty to vessels, if mooring
lines are tended.









6. PREPARATION FOR HEAVY WEATHER AT YOKOSUKA
6.1 TROPICAL CYCLONE WARNINGS
The FWC/JTWC, Guam Tropical Cyclone Warnings are based on
the most accurate forecasting techniques available.
COMSEVENTHFLT OPORD 201, Annex H (Environmental Services),
describes the techniques to be used v/hen plotting the FWC/JTWC,
Guam tropical cyclone warning track positions. An average
24-hr forecast error of 135 n mi should always be incorporated
when plotting the 24-hr forecast position in order to expand
the radius of 30-kt winds, given in the warning, by the average
forecast error. Figure 27 demonstrates this procedure and
utilizes the 135 n mi average 24-hr forecast position error in
obtaining the "danger area." Note the radius of 30-kt winds
is greater on the right side of the storm track -- the
dangerous semicircle. In this example the radius to the 30-kt
isotach is 200 n mi to the north and 150 n mi to the south of
the storm at the current position. The radius to the 30-kt
isotach is forecast to expand to 225 n mi to the north and
175 n mi to the south of the storm at the 24-hr forecast
position. At the 24-hr forecast time the danger area is then
360 n mi (225 plus 135) to the north and 310 n mi (175 plus
135) to the south of the- storm. The 48- and 72-hr forecasted
positions given in the FWC/JTWC warning provide a planning
forecast, but must also be adjusted to consider a 275 n mi and
400 n mi average forecast error, respectively.
The responsibility for overall coordination of action to
be taken by Naval activities in the Yokosuka area has been





































































assigned to Commander, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. The
Naval Weather Service Facility, Yokosuka issues the local
wind warnings. The established procedures in the event
hazardous weather is expected is contained in SOPA (ADMIN)
YOKOSUKA INSTRUCTION 5000.1 series. For easy reference,
portions of Annex W to this instruction concerning conditions
of readiness have been reproduced as Appendix C to this study.
Wind from any direction with expected sustained speeds of
48 kt or gusts in excess of 55 kt is sufficient to set storm
conditions as directed by SOPA. Typhoon conditions will be
set as above for an approaching typhoon, i.e., expected
sustained winds of 64 kt or greater. The same precautions
taken for a typhoon will also be taken for any storm.
6.2 EVASION RATIONALE
Of utmost importance is that the commander recognize the
inherent dangers that exist when exposed to the possibility of
hazardous weather. By proper utilization of the meteorological
products of the Naval Weather Service Command, especially the
FWC/JTWC, Guam Tropical Cyclone Warnings, and a basic under-
standing of weather, the commander will be able to act in the
best interest of his unit and to complete his mission when the
unfavorable weather subsides. The following time table (in
conjunction with Figures 28-32 corresponding to the five months
June-October) has been set up to aid in these actions. The
orientation of the threat axis in Figures 28-32 was arrived at
by considering the general direction from which the tropical
cyclones approached to within 180 n mi of Yokosuka as deter-
mined in Figures 17-21. The time in days to reach Yokosuka
was based on speeds contained in Table 2.
1 2 Storm/typhoon doctrine and coordination procedures for
naval forces operating in the COMNAVFORJAPAN area of responsi






Figure 28. Tropical cyclone threat axis for Yokosuka for the






Figure 29. Tropical cyclone threat axis for Yokosuka for the









Figure 30. Tropical cyclone threat axis for Yokosuka for the






Figure 31. Tropical cyclone threat axis for Yokosuka for the
month of September. Approach times to Yokosuka are based








Figure 32. Tropical cyclone threat axis for Yokosuka for the




I. An existing tropical cyclone moves into or development
takes place in area A with long range forecast movement
toward Yokosuka (recall that about 40% of all tropical
storms and typhoons recurve):
a. Review material condition of ship.
b. Reconsider any maintenance that would render the
the ship incapable of riding out a storm or typhoon
with the electrical load on ship's power, or would
render the ship incapable of getting underway, if
need be, within 48 hours.
c. Plot FWC/JTWC, Guam warnings if issued and construct
the danger area. Reconstruct the danger area for
each new warning.
II. Tropical cyclone enters area B and has started to recurve
with forecast movement toward Yokosuka (recall that prior
to recurvature tropical cyclones tend to slow in their
forward motion and after recurvature accelerate rapidly):
a. Reconsider any maintenance that would render the
ship incapable of shifting to a new berth assignment
anchorage or buoy or otherwise getting underway,
prior to the commencement of strong winds within the
harbor.
b. Anticipate Storm/Typhoon Condition III (see Appendix
C).
III. Tropical cyclone has entered area C and is recurving or
has recurved and is moving toward the Yokosuka area;
a. Anticipate Storm /Typhoon Conditions II and I (see
Appendix C) , 13
1 3Additional factors that should be considered are
contained in COMSEVENTHFLT 0P0RD 201, Annex H.
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A high velocity wind is the single most important factor
to be considered. The effects of wave action and storm surge
are negligible to the port of Yokosuka.
6.3 REMAINING IN PORT
The final decision whether to sortie (if a general sortie
has not been ordered) or not rests with the Commanding Officer
His decision-making process is indeed a careful and deliberate
consideration of all aspects relating the port of Yokosuka to
a "safe" typhoon haven. These aspects are best summarized in
a paragraph contained in a pamphlet entitled, The Measure of
a Harbor
,
prepared by the Fleet Weather Facility, Yokosuka
(now the NWSF) in 1963.
"The measure of a harbor is the sum total of
many individual factors. It is in the extent of
its shelter, depth of water at the piers, quantity
and condition,of its service craft and the
efficiency of its port services. It is measured
by the experience level of its Port Services Officer.
It is in the skill, spirit and will of his crews.
It is in the emergency capability of the Ship Repair
Facility to make a ship ready for sea. It is the
quality of the typhoon warning service and the lead
time provided the SOPA to make sound command decisions
and to the Port Services Officer to carry out smoothly
and efficiently his flexible plan of action. Finally,
the measure of a harbor is knowledge of that harbor
and all that it connotes in the mind of the Senior
Officer Present Afloat who, by his decisions, will
stamp it as a vital refuge to be taken or as an
inanimate limited shelter to refuse as a harbor for
the ships under his charge."
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Remaining in port is, in the opinion of the author, a
recommended course of action when a tropical storm or typhoon
threatens Yokosuka in most instances. The following items
must be considered:
(1) Berth reassi gnments , if necessary, should be
accomplished before 20-kt winds begin.
(2) Ships with extremely large sail areas should be
assigned preferred berthing depending on the
direction of the closest point of approach (CPA) ;
i.e., if a typhoon is forecast to pass to the east,
use berth 8, and use berth 12 if the forecast
1 4passage is to the west.
(3) Some flooding caused by heavy precipitation of the
U.S. Fleet Activities land complex may occur;
therefore, all ships should be providing their own
electrical power.
(4) A ship with a large sail area, for example a LPD
that is berthed at the floating pier (berth 10 or 11)
may want to have a tug standing by during the period
of highest winds.
(5) Ships should put out extra line and wire as deemed
necessary and should be ready to tend mooring lines.
(6) Although the rated holding strengths of the mooring
buoys inside the confines of the port are good (see
Appendix C) , they are not the preferred location
to be when high velocity winds are expected. Their
orientation with respect to the surrounding land
masses does not give them the same protection as do
the pierside berths (see Figure 6).
14 See SOPA (ADMIN) YOKOSUKA INSTRUCTION 5000.1, Harbor
Movements - Entering and Leaving Harbor
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(7) The anchorages within Yokosu.ka Bay have mud and
sand bottoms, hence their holding quality would be poor in
the event of typhoon intensity winds. In addition, anchor-
ages and mooring buoys in Yokosuka Bay are unprotected from
northerly winds and relatively unprotected from southerly
winds .
When there are crowded conditions within the Port of
Yokosuka and thus limited pierside facilities, may be an
instance when a ship would elect to evade the typhoon at sea
or anchor in Tokyo Bay.
Ships of the JMSDF consider their port of Nagura (see
Figure 6) a good typhoon haven if a ship is pierside and,
generally, do not sortie to avoid a typhoon. However, ships
anchored in the vicinity of Nagura or moored to a buoy usually
get underway and proceed to anchorages in various parts of
Tokyo Bay.
6.4 EVASION IN TOKYO BAY
JMSDF ships in the past have anchored in Tateyama Bay for
typhoon passage to the east of Tokyo Bay. They also make use
of Kisarazu Harbor (see Figure 6).
Merchant vessels have, at times, depending on the direc-
tion of the tropical storm or typhoon CPA, anchored in the
15fol 1 owi ng areas :
(1) Tropical cyclone passage to the east or south of
Tokyo Bay - anchor in Kaneda Bay.
(2) Tropical cyclone passage to the west or north of
Tokyo Bay - anchor in Chiba Harbor or Kisarazu Harbor
1 5 See Defense Mapping Agency Hvdrographic Center charts
N.O. 97151 and N.O. 97143.
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Vessels carrying a dangerous cargo must anchor as
directed by the Japanese Maritime Safety Office.
Ships requiring a pilot to. trans it the Uraga Suido
Traffic Route may be unable to secure pilot services if winds
are greater than about 35 kt because pilots embark and debark
from small motor launches.
6.5 EVASION AT SEA
The widely held doctrine of evasion at sea rather than
remaining in port for the single purpose of minimizing typhoon-
related damage is not generally recommended when in port at
Yokosuka. However, if putting to sea is desirous each tropical
storm or typhoon must be considered as differing from those
preceding it. The accompanying synoptic situation must be
fully understood. To establish one technique or rule to avoid
the danger area is not practical. The Japanese say that,
"the only solution is that there is no one solution."
In general, the effects of wave/swell generated by a
tropical cyclone generally begin to be felt in the vicinity
of Kannon Saki and may reduce the speed of advance (SOA)
thereby increasing the time required to reach the open sea
(see Figure 6). If a ship is caught in the wave/swell
pattern ahead of a tropical cyclone, in particular an intense
tropical storm or typhoon, the SOA may be reduced to the point
that the ship will be unable to maneuver to clear the danger
area (see Appendix E)
.
If the typhoon is forecast to follow a recurving track,
with a CPA to the east of Yokosuka, then a course down sea/
downwind, in the left or navigable semicirle may be advisable.
Any course to the north along the east coast of Honshu
is considered unwise. The possibility of being overrun exists
if the storm accelerates and/or turns suddenly to the north.
The average speed of advance in the higher latitudes ( 30-40 °N)
of tropical cyclones is about 25 kt; however, they have been
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tracked as fast as 50 kt. Typhoon w.ind intensities tend to
decrease as the system moves into the northern latitudes but




The conclusion reached in this study is that in most
instances the port of Yokosuka is a "safe" typhoon haven; a
port in which to remain if already there or to seek its
shelter if at sea when threatened by a typhoon. The primary
factors in reaching this conclusion are:
(1) The port provides shelter from wind and sea due
to the surrounding land masses.
(2) Wave action induced by typhoons has been negligible
in the port.
(3) Storm surge has negligible effect.
(4) The orientation of the berths and dry docks with
respect to the local topography is good.
(5) The experience level and the high degree of
competence, of the Port Services personnel.
(6) The history of the port. Conversations with
Japanese employees at Fleet Activities, Yokosuka
indicated that since 1945 there is no recollection
of U.S. Navy Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force
or merchant ships sortieing from the port of
Yokosuka due to a typhoon.
Figure 33 has been devised to assist the operational
commander in the usage of this study and to point out those
sections which have relevance in a number of threat situations
that tropical cyclones impose on the port of Yokosuka.
Based on a letter dated 21 March 1974 by Commander,
Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, serial 510, to Commanding Officer,
Environmental Prediction Research Facility, Monterey, CA.
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TPOPICAL CYCLONE DEVELOPMENT IN WESTPAC
To determine whether tropical cyclones will or will not affect
the area within 400 n mi of Yokosuka refer to:
a. Section 6.1 (p. 50) which describes tropical cyclone
warnings. Examine past and present warrfings.
b. Appendix A (p. 69) which displays the western North Pacific
cl ima tol ogi cal typhoon tracks.
c. Section 5 (p. 22) tropical cyclones affecting Yokosuka.
Review Figures 17-21 (pp. 33-37), the percent threat analyses and
Figures 22-23 (pp. 40-41), the tracks of gale associated storms.
T7~
WILL AFFECT YOKOSUKA WILL HOT AFFECT YOKOSUKA
TROPICAL CYCLONE WILL AFFECT THE
AREA WITHIN 400 N MI OF YOKOSUKA
To determine whether the tropical
cyclone will pose a threat (pass within
180 n mi) to Yokosuka refer to:
a. Section 6.1 (p. 50) which discusses
the tropical cyclone v/arnings issued by
FWC/JTWC and the local wind warnings
issued by NWSF, Yokosuka.
b. Figures 22-23 (pp. 40-41), the tracks
of gale associated storms.
c. Section 5.1 (p. 22) climatology
and Section 5.2 (p. 38) in particular,
Table 3 (p. 38) - typhoon intensity and
typhoon recurvature.
d. Review Figures 24-25 (pp. 44-45) for
the position of past storm centers when
^22 k t and >_3 4 kt winds began at Yokosuka.
TROPICAL CYCLONE WILL NOT
AFFECT THE AREA WITHIN
400 N MI OF YOKOSUKA
Continue to monitor
FWC/JTWC tropical cyclone















warnings, be alert for
significant changes.
REMA INING IN PORT
If the ship is to
remain in port refer to:
a. Section 6.2 (p. 52)
with special reference to
Figures 28-32 (pp. 53-57) .
b. Section 6.3 (p. 59)
Rema i ni ng in port
.
c . Appendix C ( p . 83)
Heavy weather and typhoon
plan for Yokosuka
EVASION AT SEA
If the ship is to evade
at sea refer to:
a . Secti on 6.5 ( p . 62)
Evasion at Sea
b. Appendix C (p. 83)
Heavy Weather and Typhoon
Plan for Yokosuka
EVASION IN TOKYO BAY
If the ship is to evade
in Tokyo Bay refer to:
a. Section 6.4 (p. 61)





Brand, S., J.W. Blelloch and O.C. Schertz, 1973: State of the
Sea Around Tropical Cyclones in the Western North Pacific
Ocean. ENVPREDRSCHFAC Tech. Paper No. 5-73.
Burroughs, L.D. and S. Brand, 1972: Speed of Tropical Storms
and Typhoons after Recurvature in the Western North
Pacific Ocean . ENVPREDRSCHFAC Tech. Paper No. 7-72.
Chin, P.C., 1972: Tropical Cyclone Climatology for the China
Seas and Western Pacific from 1884 to 1970 . Hong Kong
Royal Observatory, 207 pp..
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, 1974: COMNAVFORJAPANINST
3140. 1J.
Commander, U.S. Fl eet Acti vi ties , Yokosuka, 1974: COMFLEACTINST
3140. 1L.
Commander, U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, 1972: SOPA (ADMIN)
Yokosuka Instruction 5000.1.
Crutcher, H.L. and R.G. Quayle, 1974: Mariners Worldwide
Climatic Guide to Tropical Storms in Sea . NAVAIR 50-1C-61.
Director, Defense Mapping Agency, Hydrographic Center, 1972:




Gray, W.M., 19 70: A Climatology of Tropical Cyclones and
Disturbances of the Western Pacific with a Suggested
Theory for their Genesis and Maintenance . NAVWEARSCHFAC
Tech. Paper No. 19-70.
Harding, E.T. and W.J. Kotsch, 1965: Heavy Weather Guide .
Ma ry land: United States Naval Institute, 209 pp.
Japanese Maritime Safety Agency, 1972: Maritime Traffic
Safety Law , 30 pp.
Miyazaki, M., 1974: Characteristics of Storm Surges Induced
by Typhoons along the Japanese Coast . Meteorological
Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan, 5' pp.
N a g 1 e , F . W . , 19 72: A Numerical Study i n Optimum Track Ship
Routing Climatology . ENVPREDRSCHFAC Tech. Paper No. 10-72.
Riehl, H., 1971: Intensity of Recurving Typhoons .
NAVWEARSCHFAC Tech. Paper No. 3-71.
66

Somervell, W.L. and J.D. Jarrell, 1970: Tropical Cyclone
Evasion Planning . NAVWEARSCHFAC Tech. Paper No. 16-69
(Rev) .
U.S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Center, 1973: Shore
Protection Manual, Volume V . Fort Bel voir, Virginia,
Chapter 3.
U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 1974: Pacific Ocean
Port Directory Volume V .
U.S. Commander Seventh Fleet, COMSEVENTHFLT 0P0RD 201-(YR),
Annex H.
U.S. Fleet Weather Central /Joi nt Typhoon Warning Center, 1961:
Annual Typhoon Report, 1961 . Guam, Mariana Islands.
U.S. Fleet Weather Central /Joi nt Typhoon Warning Center, 1971:
Annual Typhoon Report, 1971 . Guam, Mariana Islands.
U.S. Fleet Weather Central/Joint Typhoon Warning Center, 1972:
Annual Typhoon Report, 1972 . Guam, Mariana Islands.
U.S. Fleet Weather Central /Joi nt Typhoon Warning Center, 1973:
Annual Typhoon Report
,
1973 . Guam, Mariana Islands.
U.S. Fleet Weather Facility, Yokosuka, Japan, 1963: The
Measure of a Harbor .
U.S. Naval Weather Service Environmental Detachment, Asheville,
N . C
.




U.S. Naval Oceanograph i c Office, 1969: Fleet Guide Tokyo Wan
,






Figures A-l through A-9 show monthly and semi-monthly
(June to October) tracks of western North Pacific tropical
cyclones (1946-1969) which were at one time of typhoon













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The following is a partial listing of the harbor
facilities available at Yokosuka. For a complete discussion
see the Port Directory, Volume V, Pacific Ocean and the Fleet
Guide, Tokyo Wan, H. 0. 916, current edition.
1. BERTHING AND FACILITIES
a. Moorings, Docks, Etc. There are five inshore
designated anchorages for large vessels and a quarantine
anchorage area for numerous large vessels. Anchorages
anchorages have mud and sand bottom, poor protection and
depth range of 11 to 25 fathoms of water. There are
four inshore mooring buoys for vessels in 8 to 14 fathoms
of water. A fuel buoy (IMODCO) is located at 35° 18'37"N,
139° 40
' 01 "E for deep draft tankers to pump fuel to
Azuma Island.
In Yokosuka Ko there are ten sets of bow and stern
mooring buoys which afford fair portection. These buoys
are in depths ranging from 3-1/2 to 7-3/4 fathoms. Note:
JMSDF ships use these mooring buoys on a regular basis,
When the port is the threatened with typhoon winds, USN
ships move pierside and the JMSDF ships will generally






















































Concrete Pier, 62' Wide




Floating Pier, 67' Wide













900' 28' Sea Wall
(Plus 270' to Buoy X-15)
200' 42* Sea Wall
556' 41
' DD No. 6 (Wet Berth)
240' 18' Sea Wall
31 ' Sea Wall (Med Moor)
Brows are available at all berths. Depths indicated are
alongside depths. Desired depths are achieved by
utilizing camels.
b. Fuel. COMFLEACTS operations port control
furnishes fuel requirements and schedules delivery by
yard services craft: however, AVGAS can be delivered
only at Army fuel pier at Hakozaki Terminal on Azuma
Island, adjacent to Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. Sludge
barges with 200,000 gallons capacity are available
under contract from Yokohama on 48 hour notice. Reserve
stocks of fuel hose are available from NSD, Yokosuka.
One fuel barge (Yo) is available as follows:
YO-49 USS WHIPST0CK
10,171 Barrels NSF0 (472,182 Gallons)
1*694 Barrels Diesel (71,148 Gallons)
c. Mechanical Handling Facilities. Permanent
dockside cranes are available at all berths except 1, 2,
3, 6, 7, 10, and 11, which are serviced by mobile cranes,
Three floating cranes are available to ships at
anchorage and berths: one 150 ton and two 30 ton. All
three sel f-propel 1 ed.
1
Dockside cranes vary from 350 tons at Piedmont pier
to 27-1/2 tons at Dry Dock No. 1. Crane capacity at
majority of berths is 60 tons.
d. Dry docks and repair facilities. Naval ship
repair facility, Yokosuka has the following dry docks.
Mobile dockside cranes are secured when not in use and








1 436 67 16
2 498 66 24
3 298 38 14
4 785 85 30
5 1 ,056 114 37
6 1,099 156 45
See Figure B-l . Dry Dock 6 can be pumped dry in
about 4 hours and flooded in 3 hours.
e. Stevedores. Stevedores are available to issue
ships for loading resupply and off-loading cargo only.
f. Port Capacity. The NSD cargo branch can moor
between tv/o and four merchant type ships simultaneously
in dry Dry Dock No. 6 when used as a wet basin, depending
upon the vessels L.O.A., Beam and Draft. Under the
present Stevedore contract, six gangs are guaranteed per
24-hour period. Each gang averages 30 M/T per hour when
loading or discharging general cargo.
2. SERVICES, LOGISTICS AND OPERATIONS
a. Lighterage. Tugs, vehicle lighters, pilots,
berthing arrangements, camels, and brows will be arranged
by Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. Port services
should be requested in the LOGREQ, and by contacting the
operations department.
Four tugs (YTM type) are available with 1,000 horse-
power each, and two YTB with 2000 horsepower plus 10
pusher boats with 500 horsepower each.
Four barges are available: Two YCV (aircraft lighters,
three feet draft) 200' X 65' and one YC (cargo lighters,
three feet draft with three and one-half feet freeboard)






The following paragraphs are portions of the Heavy
Weather and Typhoon Plan to SOPA (ADMIN) YOKOSUKA
INSTRUCTION 5000.1 dated 30 November 1972. Subparagraphs
marked with an asterisk (*) indicate the proposed changes
to the current instruction which may appear in the new
Heavy Weather and Typhoon Plan.
The buoys in Yokosuka Bay, the port of Yokosuka and
Nagura Harbor are found in Appendix IV to Annex W of the







Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3140. 24A
(b) Annex H to CINCPACFLT OPORD 201- ( YR)
(c) COMNAVFORJAPANINST 3140.1 J
(d) Pamphlet "Measure of a Harbor," by Fleet Weather
Facility, Yokosuka, Japan
(e) Annex H to COMSEVENTHFLT OPORD 201-(YR)
1 . Purpose . . .
2. Basic Instructions. . .
3. General Weather Information
4. Recej.p t and Dissemination of Warnings .
5. Conditions of Readiness . During
typhoon or a destructive storm toward
will normally direct the establishmen
readiness as may be ordered by COMNAV
of COMNAVFORJAPAN orders, SOPA will s
of readiness, together with minimum p
required for each, are described in t
a- CONDITION IV. Trend indica
destructive winds within seventy -two
Condition IV is normally set on 1 dun
through 30 November as directed by re
b. CONDITION III
TTT~ Def i ni ti on: Destructive winds are possible
'within forty-eight hours.
(2) Consj derat ions : As it
foretell the exact location of a typh
the approach of a
the Yokosuka area, SOPA
t of such conditions of




tes possi bi 1 i ty of
hours (see reference (a))
e and remains in effect
ference ( c)
.
hours hence, Condition III is usually
area as a precautionary measure. The
taken will usually not interfere undu
and consist mainly of insuring that p
that personnel, power plants and othe
readily available should Condition II
( 3) Minimum action require
is most difficult to
oon or storm forty-eight
set over an extensive
minimum actions to be
ly with normal routine
lans are completed and
r facilities will be
or I be set.
d of all ships:
(a) Establish continuo
2716 KHZ, and 277.8 MHZ (Naval Ships)
administrative and low precedence ope
nets .
(b) All ships capable
or storm at sea will take on fuel as
liminary preparations for getting und
become advisable.
us watch on 328.2 MHZ,
and cease transmitting
rational traffic on these
of evading the typhoon
necessary. Commence pre-
erway should the latter
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1. Hoist in all small boats not
actual ly i n. use.
2. Ships disabled due to overhaul of
machinery or tender upkeep commence immediately to place
main engines in operable condition.
(c) Vessels alongside piers put out extra
hawsers, making allowance for rapid changes in height of water.
(4) Minimum action required of COMFLEACTS
Yokosuka :
(a) Prepare to place Storm Bills in effect
for land and harbor installations.
(b) Make preparations for securing all small
boats and service craft and ships not capable of evading the
typhoon or storms at sea.
(c) Alert Harbor Tugs for employment in
assisting vessels.
(d) Assist ships to shift to previously assigned
berths
.
( 5) Minimum act i on_re_qui red for all aircraft:
Commanders responsible prepare to evacuate, tie down and/or
stow aircraft, establishing contact with Fifty Air Force,
Fuchu AF Command Post to insure full coordination.
c. CONDITION II
(1) Definition: Destructive winds are anticipated
within twenty- four hours.
( 2
)
Minimum action regjjjjiejj of all ships :
X*aT~ If Condition III has not previously been
set, carry out pertinent provisions of paragraph 5.b. (3)
above
.
*(b) Unless otherwise directed by SOPA, liberty
may be granted at the discretion of Commanding Officers for
those personnel not essential to maintain the readiness
required for this condition.
(c) Cease loading and unloading operations.
(d) Hoist all remaining small boats and shift
small craft to sheltered berths previously assigned.
(e) Ships nested break up nests and proceed
to assigned berths as directed by COMFLEACTS Operations
Department, Port Control Office.
(f) If anchored, veer chain to maximum safe
scope. If moored to a buoy, veer to maximum safe swinging
radius.
(g) Raise steam and be prepared to shift
berths i f requi red
.





d i s c r e
ment
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d e s i r i n
















Be prepared to sortie if directed,
sortie independently may do so at their
ng SOPA and COMFLEACTS Operations Depart-
Off i ce , if general sortie is not ordered.
imum action_requi_re d of COMFLEACTS
Carry out provisions of paragraph 5.b.(4)
dy accomplished.
Implement Storm Bill for land and harbor
Be prepared to berth and mess small boat
parties unable to return to their ships.
In the even.t SOPA cancels liberty, direct
er to return all liberty parties in the
imum ac tj_oji required for all aircraft :










(2) Cons i de.r ati o ns : When Condition I
odds are greatly in favor of the near passage of
or s.torm. Periodic o.s dilations* and small scale
movements of the eye of a typhoon make 'it almost impossible
foretell whether the center will pass or miss any given




and 5 . c .
to sortie
( 3) Minimum a c_ti on requi re_d of all ships and
Complete the actions required under paragraphs 5,b.
above, and take all additional precautions necessary
or ride out the storm as directed or necessary.
6. Mer chant^ Shipping Pr esent. Commander Fleet Activities,
Yokosuka, will keep all U.S. merchant ships present advised
of the receipt of typhoon advisories, the setting of typhoon
conditions of readiness, require that they take adequate
precautions commensurate with the condition set, and if







APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX W
ESTIMATE FORCE TO DRAG MOORING 1
Yokosuka Bay: Nagura Harbor:
Buoy No. Force in Tons Buoy No. Force in Tons
1 120 C-l n 100
3 120 C-l s^ 100
10 180 C-3 n 100
11 180 C-3 £ 100
Yokosuka Harbor: C-4 n 100
D-2 n 100 C-4 s_ 70
D-2 s_ 100 C-5 n 70
D-3 n 70 C-5 s_ 70
D-3 s_ 70 C-6 n 70
D-4 n 100 C-6 s_ 70
D-4 s_ 100 C-7. n 50
.
D-5 n • 60 C-7 s_ • 50
D-5 s_ 60 C-8 n 50
D-6 n 50 C-8 s_ 50
D-6 i 50
D-8 n 50
D-8 s^ 50 i
D-9 n 60
D-9 s 60 i






See Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographi c Center Chart N.O.






CASE STUDIES OF TYPHOONS NANCY (SEPTEMBER 1961)
AND VIOLET (OCTOBER 1961) 1
The case histories of Typhoons Nancy and Violet of 1961
are of interest in that they resulted in typhoon strength wind
gusts of 71 kt from the south-southwest and 74 kt from the
north-northwest, respectively, in the port of Yokosuka.
Nancy passed 130 n mi to the northwest and Violet passed 30
n mi to the southeast of Yokosuka. Figure D-l shows the
best track and intensity of Typhoon Nancy as it approached




The tropical depression which was to be Typhoon Nancy
was upgraded to a tropical storm on 8 September at 0000Z
(080000Z) in the vicinity of 5N, 160E. By the time a
reconnaissance fix could be made, Nancy had surface winds
of 125 kt revealing that she was an "explosive deepener" and
probably reached typhoon intensity at 071800Z. Nancy followed
a general northwesterly track, passing some 85 n mi south-
southwest of Guam at 101800Z with 180 kt surface winds. A
peak intensity of 185 kt was reached prior to recurvature.
Nancy began to recurve near 20N, 130E passing about 40 n mi
east of Okinawa at 141500Z and then headed north-northeast,
accelerating very rapidly. The typhoon entered Honshu near
From "The Measure of a Harbor", Fleet Weather Facility,
Yokosuka, Japan, 1963.




DAY/TIME 9 IMTENSITY/SPEEO OF ADVANCE
30°N
150°E
Figure D-l. Best track of Typhoon Nancy (14-16 Sep 1961)
.
LEGEND:















Figure D-2. Best track of Typhoon Violet (9-10 Oct 1961)
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Osaka, which is about 210 n mi west of-Yokosuka, at 160430Z,
moving at about 28 kt with surface winds of 75 kt. She
made a rapid transit across Honshu emerging into the Japan
Sea near Nanao and continued north-northeast to Hokkaido.
Nancy's surface winds remained over 100 kt for 8 days,
from 080000Z to 1 60000Z . She traveled 4275 mi at an average
speed of 18 kt. The minimum speed was 11 kt on 15 September
and the maximum speed was 55 kt when Nancy was over northern
Japan .
In Japan there were 172 persons reported dead, 18 missing
and 3,184 injured. More than 300 ships were sunk and many
more damaged. At the end of the 1961 typhoon season,
Japanese officials said Nancy was rated sixth in the number
of persons killed by an individual typhoon. Typhoon Vera
killed 4,464 persons in Nagoya on 26 September 1959, the
worst in Japanese history.
Typhoon Nancy tested the port of Yokosuka on 16 September
1961 with sustained winds of 50 kt and gusts up to 71 kt as
recorded by the Fleet Weather Facility (FWF), Yokosuka.
Figure D-3 is the disposition of 20 ships (18 USN, 1 USCG,
and 1 USNS) in port during the passage of Nancy.
The following are some pertinent comments by the
various commands listed in Figure D-3. Under the column













Wind 45 kt/200°-No difficul
ties experienced.
Excellent berth for a LST
Wind 55kt/180°-The loan of
a wire was helpful (for secur-
ing).
Wind 45-50 k t/1 80° - I deal
berth for a sub.
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Figure D-3. Ship disposition in port Yokosuka during the













TERRELL CTY (LST1157) #5
Wind 55 kt/ 1 80 °-200 °-The
ship rode well in this berth.
Higher winds might necess-
itate putting ship in stern
to with a FWD anchor out with
45-60 fathoms of chain.
Wind 38 kt-Excellent berth
Wind 55 kt/195 °-200° -Baro-
metric pres 29.161. The ship
rode the storm in fine con-
dition.
Wind 55 kt/180°-No surge or
roll was encountered. The
wind over the forecastle and
bridge was moderate. The wind
across the fantail and flight
deck was stronger. Gusts were
recorded with a hand anemeter
to 53 knots on the flight deck
The ship could have been
positioned about 50 ft further
ahead at the pier which might
have lessened wind force over
the flight deck. Ship had
been positioned on Friday,
15 September to avoid brow
interference with the USS
POLLUX (AKS-4) at Pier 3.
The position was satisfactory
for safe and secure mooring.
Wind 65 kt/180°-This berth
was yery satisfactory but
berth #13 would be more
suitable if the ship had to
get underway to assist another
shi p .
Wind 33-52 k t/1 90°-2 20 °-




Wind 50 kt/200°-No diffi-
cul ti es .
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SHIP BERTH . REMARKS
TILLAMOOK #85 Wind 60-70 kt-Gusts from
(ATA192) S-SW-Berth #8s is well
shel tered
.
Below is the text of the final message by the Senior





1. NANCY, WITH GUSTS TO 71 KTS, WEATHERED WITHOUT
DAMAGE BY ALL FLEET UNITS YOKOSUKA. PROTECTED MOORINGS
PROVIDED FOR SHIPS PRESENT BY COMFLEACTS PORT SERVICES
PLUS ACCURACY AND EXCELLENCE OF ADVICE BY FLEET




Based on a reported surface wind of 45 kt in the vicin-
ity of 20N, 147E the first Tropical Storm Violet warning
was issued on 4 October 1961 at 0000Z (04000Z). She moved
southwest and intensified, reaching typhoon strength at
approximately 041200Z. Violet made an abrupt turn toward the
northwest near 16N, 144E at about 051200Z, She reached
maximum strength of 180 kt from 070000Z to 071200Z while some
1000 n mi south of Yokosuka. Violet then started to weaken
slightly and headed to the north-northwest, recurving at about
28N. She continued to follow a smooth parabolic track and
passed about 30 n mi to the southeast of Yokosuka at 092 200
Z
moving at a speed of 27 kt and still had sustained surface
winds of 70 kt.
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Violet traveled 2050 mi in the 6 days and 18 hours that
warnings were being issued. Her minimum speed was 4 kt when
she made the turn from a heading of southwest to northwest
and her maximum speed of 31 kt occurred after she passed
Tokyo.
Only minor damage occurred to Japan in the Tokyo area,
due to gusty winds. Two deaths were attributed to the
typhoon in Japan.
The resultant winds at Yokosuka from Typhoon Violet
lashed the port with 74 kt gust from the north-northeast
as reported by FWF on 10 October 1961. Figure D-4 is
the disposition of the 36 ships (35 USM, 1 USCG) in port
during the passage of Violet. Table D-l lists the ships
in port by ship type and berth assignment.
The following are some pertinent comments by various



















Wind estimated 35 kt. Berth
#1 sheltered by building.
Secure berth.
Wind 40 kt gusts to 50/010°.
Berth #1 adequate for winds
at least 20 kt or higher.
Wind 40 kt gusts to 60 kt.
Berth satisfactory.
In future recommend LST's
be berthed earliest to
preclude possible accidents
compounded by high winds,
large sail area, flat bottom
Berth satisfactory.
Winds 38 kt/045°. Excellent
berth
.
Wind estimated 60 kt/345°.
Berth satisfactory.










































Figure D-4. Ship disposition in port of Yokosuka during the
































Wind 45 kt at 340°. Berth
sati s factory.
Wind 35 kt gusts 55 kt 350°-
1/2-101°. Berth satisfactory.
Considerable chafing of stern
spring line. A bollard on the
seawall will be needed for
storms whose centers will pass
west of Yokosuka with ensuing
southerly winds. This will
enable passing lines, wire
and chain to ensure minimum
chafing and leverage action.
Wind 50 kt gusts to 58kt/340°.
Berth suitable.
Wind 50 kt gusts to 65 kt/355°
Berth considered marginal for
ships exceeding 150 ft in
length with winds exceeding 75
kts.
Wind indicator in repair.
Good berth.




Wind estimated 50 kt/330°.
Berth suitable.
Winds 30 kt with gusts to 45
kt/330°. Berth considered
ideal and well secluded.
Wind 30 kt/030°. Berth
sati sf actory .
Winds maximum 70 kt/350°.
Berth considered highly suit-
able for similar typhoons.
Wind 32 kt/195°. Berth suitable
Wind estimated 20 kt. Suitable
typhoon berth.
























1 ocated at berth




Otherwi se f i ne






Wind 30 kt gusts to 60 kt/




Wind maximum 50 kt. Another
camel and clearance of
protruding equipment near
south end of berth needed.
Wind and sea on port qtr drove
port bow into pier causing
minor damage. Consider mooring
could not be held if stern had
extended past northwest end of
pier. 2 chocks 2 bitts 6 manila
lines and 4 wires carried away.
Stern anchor wire and bow
anchor chain held.
Line handlers worked through
the night tending lines to
maintain an even strain on
moorings. During heaviest blow
had steam to guarding valves,
split plant operations, in
preparation for easing strain
on lines by use of main engines
but did not find this necessary
Berth evaluated adequate. Some
difficulty because of tumbling
of double camels and clogging
of cooling water intakes by
debris. Recommend that ships
using this berth during heavy
weather be moored with bow to
sea wall to keep screws clear
for backing should lines part.
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Table D-l. 'Ships present list Yokosuka 10 October, 1961







GEORGE K MACKENZIE DD386
GURKE DD783












15 RECLAIMER ARS42 9
9 REGULUS AF57 3
16 ROWAN DD782 2
1 RUPERTUS DD851 DD#5
2 SAMUEL N MOORE DD747 17
DD#5 SOMERS DD947 HMP-E
4
6 SOUTHERLAND DDR743 DD#5
DD#2 TAYLOR DDE468 10
TILLAMOOK ATA192 18
14 TOM GREEN CTY LST1159 2
HENRY W TUCKER DDR875 3
8s TUNNY SSG282 15
1 VERNON CTY LST1161 DD#5
7 WALKER DDE517 11
10 MAHOPAC ATA196 18
8 CAIMAN SS323 1
MEDREGAL SS480 1
15 CAYUGA CTY LST529 HMP-W
14 WHIPPOORWILL MSC207 4s
Legend: DD = Dry Dock
HMP(E/W) - Harbor Master Pier (East/West)
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EFFECTS OF TYPHOON VIOLET IN TRUMAN BAY
(Body of water between berths 8 and 12)
Comment by the Port Services Officer:
The only minor damage received during Typhoon VIOLET
was at Berth 9 which has a heading of 139°T. Maximum winds
received was 65 knots taken by the RECLAIMER. This berth
was accommodating the USCG BERING STRAIT (WAVP 382) and out
board was the USS RECLAIMER (ARS 42). The configuration
of the ships was compatible but small camels between the
ships caused excessive pressure on the BERING STRAIT by
the RECLAIMER from the surging of the ship due to rise in
the sea level and the pocketing effect at the sea wall end
of Berth 9. The damage to the BERING STRAIT could have
possibly been averted by the use of cluster fenders between
the two ships instead of the small wooden camels. Also
added emphasis could possibly have been from the pontoon
float at the Boat Pool which undoubtedly redirected some of
the force of the water in the direction of Berth 9. The
pontoon floats at the Boat Pool received a surge of
approximately 4 feet which caused them to part.
Below is the text of the final message by SOPA




EYE OF VIOLET PASSED WITHIN 30 MILES YOKOSUKA WHICH
BROUGHT 74 KT GUSTS TO THIS AREA. STORM WEATHERED
WITHOUT DAMAGE BY ALL FLEET UNITS PRESENT. AGAIN FINE
WORK BY FLEET WEATHER FACILITY AND COMFLEACTS PORT
SERVICES MAJOR FACTOR IN AVOIDANCE DAMAGE.
BT
The decision to remain in port and face the awesome
power of Typhoon Violet and the forecasted wind gusts of
70-80 kt at Yokosuka was made while the center was still
about 700 n mi south of Yokosuka. The significance of the
decision and the after effects prompted COMSEVENTHFLT to
100

say, in part, in a report to Commander in Chief, U.S.
Pacific Fleet ". . . At Yokosuka most SEVENTH Fleet ships
chose to ride her out in port. There was no damage to







Figures E-l and E-2 represent the estimated resul-
tant speed-of-advance of a ship in a given sea condition.
The original relationships were based on data of speed
versus sea state obtained from studies of many ships by
James, 1957. They should not be regarded as truly repre-
sentative of any particular ship (Nagle, 1972).
For example, from Figure E-l, for a ship making 15
kt encountering waves of 16 ft approaching from 030° (rel-
ative to the ship's heading) one can expect the speed-of-
advance to be slowed to about 9 kt. Twenty foot seas,
under the same condition, would result in a speed-of-advance
of slightly less than 6 kt. However, it is emphasized
that these figures are averages and the true values will
vary slightly from ship to ship.
Figure E-3 shows the engine speed required to offset
selected wind velocities for various ship types (computed
for normal loading conditions).
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SKIP SPEED IH (knots)
Figure E-l. Ship speed as a function of wave height and wave





































gure E-2. Ship speed as a function of wave height and wave







THE CURVES SHOWN WERE DEVELOPED USING THE BASIC FORMULA:
WIND LOAD* R„AV*
WHERE R„ IS EQUAL TO WIND FRICTION FACTOR. (R„ IS GENERALLY TAKEN AS 0.004.)
V IS EQUAL TO WIND VELOCITY IN KNOTS.
A IS EQUAL TO PROJECTED AREA A30VE THE WATERL1NE IN SQ. FT.
THREE SETS OF CALCULATIONS WITH VARYING R„ WERE USED.
ILLUSTRATED REPRESENT THE MEAN OF THESE VALUES.
THE PLOTTED VALUES
Figure E-3. Engine speed vs. wind velocity for offsetting
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c.l An evaluation of *-he
harbor of Yokosuka, Ja-
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